This paper deals with the research area of cooperative interval games arising from airport situations with interval data. We also extend to airport interval games some results from classical theory.
Introduction
In literature much attention is paid to airport situations and related games. We refer here to Littlechild and Owen (1977) , Littlechild and Thompson (1977) and Tijs and Driessen (1986) . In airport situations costs of the coalitions are considered. A cost game < N, c > is a cooperative game, where N is the set of players, and c : 2 N → R is a function assigning to each coalition S ∈ 2 N a real number in which c(S) is the cost of the coalition S with c(∅) = 0. A game < N, c > is called concave (or submodular) if and only if c(S ∪ T ) + c(S ∩ T ) ≤ c(S) + c(T ) for all S, T ∈ 2 N . It is well known that airport games are concave. The economists Baker (1965) and Thompson (1971) proposed an appealing rule now called the Baker-Thompson rule. The idea is that only users of a piece of the runway pay for that piece and they share the cost of it equally. The core C (Gillies (1959) ) and the Shapley value φ (Shapley (1953) ) are central solution concepts defined on the class of classical cooperative games. The Shapley value is a core element on the class of concave games. Littlechild and Owen (1973) showed that the BakerThompson rule corresponds to the Shapley value. For a game < N, c > and
and the Shapley value φ(u * K ) of the dual K-unanimity game u * K is defined by
We recall that the decomposition of an airport game < N, c > using dual unanimity games is given by c = m k=1 t k u * ∪ m r=k Nr , where t k is the extra cost to extend a runway which is already suitable for landings of planes of type k − 1 to the one which is suitable for landings of planes of type k, and N = ∪ m r=1 N r is the set of all users of the runway. In this paper we consider airport situations, where cost of pieces of the runway are intervals. Then, we associate as in the classical case to such a situation an interval cost game and extend to airport interval games the results presented above. The rest of the paper is organized as follows. We recall in Section 2 basic notions and facts from interval calculus and the theory of cooperative interval games. Section 3 is devoted to airport situations with interval data and related airport interval games. We conclude in Section 4 with some final remarks on other economic and OR situations with interval data.
Preliminaries
We start with some preliminaries from interval calculus (Alparslan Gök, Branzei and Tijs (2008a)). We denote by I(R) the set of all closed intervals in R, and by I(R)
N the set of all n-dimensional vectors with elements in I(R). Let I, J ∈ I(R) with I = I, I , J = J, J , |I| = I − I and α ∈ R + . Then, I + J = I + J, I + J ; αI = αI, αI . The partial substraction operator I − J is defined, only if |I| ≥ |J|, by I − J = I − J, I − J . We say that I is weakly better than J, which we denote by I J, if and only if I ≥ J and I ≥ J. We also use the reverse notation J I, if and only if J ≤ I and J ≤ I. Now, we give basic definitions and some useful results of cooperative inter- 
class of size monotonic interval games with player set N . An interval game < N, d > is called concave if < N, d > is submodular and < N, |d| > is concave (or submodular), i.e.
and |d| (S) + |d| (T ) ≥ |d| (S ∪ T ) + |d| (S ∩ T ) for all S, T ∈ 2 N . In the following we give a characterization for concave interval games. Note that the fact that < N, |d| > is concave (or submodular) implies that < N, |d| > is a monotonic game because for each S, T ∈ 2 N with S ⊂ T we have |d| (S) + |d| (T \ S) ≥ |d| (T ) + |d| (∅), and this implies that |d| (S) ≥ |d| (T ). As a by-product we have each concave interval game < N, d > is size monotonic. order σ(1), σ(2) , . . . , σ(n) and each player is given the marginal contribution he/she creates by entering. We denote the set of predecessors of i in σ by P σ (i) = {r ∈ N |σ −1 (r) < σ −1 (i)}, where σ −1 (i) denotes the entrance number of player i, and define
The interval Shapley value Φ : SM IG
We notice that the interval Shapley value Φ(d) is an interval core element on the class of concave interval games.
Airport situations with interval data and related games
Consider the aircraft fee problem of an airport with one runway. Suppose that the planes which are to land are classified into m types. One can think that the runway is divided into m consecutive pieces, namely P 1 , . . . , P m , and P 1 is sufficient for planes of type 1, P 1 and P 2 together are sufficient for planes of type 2, P 1 , P 2 and P 3 are together sufficient for planes of type 3 etc.. Let T j [0, 0] be the interval cost of piece P j . Let N j be the set of players who own a plane of type j. Then, N = ∪ m j=1 N j is the set of all users of the runway. Let n j denote the number of planes of type j. Let S ⊂ N be a coalition with S ∩ N j = ∅ and S ∩ N j+1 = ∅. Then, this coalition needs the pieces P 1 , . . . , P j of the runway. The interval cost of the used pieces of the runway is equal to 
To give a formal description of d we introduce interval games of the form < N, T c >, where < N, c > is the classical cooperative cost game and T ∈ I(R + ). We denote by I(R + ) the set of all closed intervals in R + . Let T ∈ I(R + ) and c : 2 N → R. Then, the interval game < N, T c > is defined by (T c)(S) = c(S)T for each S ∈ 2 N . We notice that the Φ(T c) for the interval game < N, T c > is related with the Shapley value φ(c) of the classical game < N, c > as follows:
Now we give the description of the airport interval game as follows:
In the following proposition we show that airport interval games are concave. Next we propose an interval cost allocation rule β, which we call the interval Baker-Thompson rule. For a given airport interval situation the Baker-Thompson allocation for a player i of type j is as follows:
Note that for the piece P k of the runway the users are ∪ m r=k N r , i.e. there are m r=k n r users. So, ( m r=k n r ) −1 T k is the equal cost share of each user. This means that a player i of type j contributes to the cost of the pieces P 1 , . . . , P j . We notice that it is helpful to implement the interval Baker-Thompson allocation when the uncertainty regarding the costs of pieces of the runway is removed. For details regarding the use of interval solutions for determining the distribution of achieved common costs we refer the reader to Branzei, Tijs and Alparslan . In the following proposition we show that the interval Baker-Thompson allocation rule coincides with the interval Shapley value of the corresponding airport interval game. Proof. Notice that Φ(d) is additive. Then, for i ∈ N j we have
where the second equality follows from the additivity of Φ(d) and the third equality follows from (2) .
Note that if we consider the special case
, . . . ,
). Here, each piece of the runway is completely paid by the users and all users of the same piece contribute equally. It is proved in Alparslan Gök, Branzei and Tijs (2008b) that the interval Shapley value is an interval core element for convex interval games. Since the airport interval games are concave by Proposition 3.1 the proof of the following proposition is straightforward. Notice also that 
Final remarks
In this paper we studied airport situations with interval data and related games. Other economic and Operations research situations with interval data and related interval games have been also studied. 
